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Abstract—Network neutrality has recently been the topic of an
important debate, in both the telecommunication and political
worlds, because of its potential impact in every-day life. While
there has been many studies discussing the advantages and
drawbacks of neutrality, there is no game-theoretical study
dealing with the observable situation of competitive ISPs in front
of a (quasi-)monopolistic content provider (CP), while it is a
complaint from ISPs, and an illustration of the non-neutrality
need. This paper provides a first game-theoretical analysis of
relations between two competitive ISPs and a single CP, in the
form of a four-level game, played at different time scales. This
game is analyzed by backward induction. We show that while
the complaint from ISPs is relevant with a such a competitive
model, inserting side payments does not solve the problem.
I. INTRODUCTION
This paper deals with the network neutrality debate. The
possibility of introducing non-neutrality comes from the in-
creasing traffic asymmetry between Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), mainly due to some prominent and resource consum-
ing content providers (CPs) which are usually connected to
a single ISP. The typical example is YouTube (owned by
Google), accessed by all users while hosted by a single Tier
1 ISP, and whose traffic now constitutes a non-negligible
part of the whole Internet traffic. For this reason, there has
been a surge of protest among ISPs, complaining that the
current Internet business model where ISPs charge both end-
users and content providers directly connected to them, and
have public peering or transit agreements with other ISPs,
is not relevant anymore, because they should charge content
providers that are associated with other ISPs. This was first
advocated at the end of 2005, by Ed Whitacre (CEO of
AT&T) [1]. The underlying concern is that investment is
made by ISPs but content providers get an important part of
the dividends. The revenue arising from online advertising
(meaning showing graphical ads on regular web pages) is
estimated at approximately a $24 billion in 2009 [2] while
textual ads on search pages has led to a combined revenue of
$8.5 billion in 2007 [3], those figures increasing every year.
Meanwhile, transit prices - which constitutes the main source
of revenues for transit ISPs - are decreasing. ISPs argue that
there is no sufficient incentive for them to continue to invest
on the network infrastructures if most benefits go to content
providers. The threat is to lower the quality of service of
CPs that do not pay any fee to them, or even to block their
traffic. This possibility has led to protests from CPs and user
associations, complaining that this might impact the network
development and is an impingement of freedom of speech [1].
This has launched a debate, essentially at the law and policy
makers level, to decide whether the Internet should be neutral,
i.e. all packets should receive equal treatments in terms of
price and service. In the US, the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) released in 2007 a report not supporting neutrality
constraints, increasing the debate at the political level. This
debate is also active in Europe and in France, as illustrated
by the open consultation on network neutrality launched in
2010. For instance, the French regulation authority, ARCEP,
has published in its response a proposal intending to define
how net neutrality could be implemented [4], [5].
Our goal here is to provide a mathematical analysis of
the advantages and drawbacks of network neutrality. This
type of work has recently received an increasing attention
in the literature. The idea is to investigate the output of the
interactions between selfish actors that are end users, CPs and
ISPs, using the framework of non-cooperative game theory
[6], [7].
Let us briefly describe here, non exhaustively, some impor-
tant existing works in this direction. In [8], [9], the authors
propose to share the revenue among providers using the
Shapley value, the only mechanism that satisfies a set of
axioms representing a sense of fairness; in this case CPs
participate to the network access cost. The work in [10]
analyzes how neutrality or non-neutrality affects provider
investment incentives, network quality and user prices. A
similar comparison is made in [11] between a two-sided
pricing where ISPs are allowed to charge CPs, and one-sided
pricing where such side-payments are not allowed. In each
case, at the equilibrium of the game, the levels of investment
in content and architecture are determined. The paper gives
conditions on the ratio between parameters characterizing
advertising rates and end-user price sensitivity, under which
a non-neutral network outperforms a neutral one in terms of
social welfare. On the other hand, [12] investigates the case
where ISPs negotiate joint investment contracts with a CP in
order to enhance the quality of service and increase industry
profits. It is found that an unregulated regime leads to higher
quality investments, but that ISPs have an incentive to degrade
content quality. The paper [13] studies the implications of non-
neutral behaviors, taking into account advertising revenues and
considering both cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios.
Finally, in [14], a game-theoretic model is considered with
a single CP, a single ISP, a (consumers’) demand function
that depends on price and quality of service, and involving
advertisement and network investment components.
In those works, there is in general a single ISP, and one
or several CPs. Though, in practice, we often have ISPs in
competition for customers, while for many services, the CPs
are in a quasi monopole, a characteristic ISPs complain about.
The typical example is YouTube. We propose to specifically
address this issue in this paper. Remark that in addition to
[11], considering competitive ISPs has been proposed in [15],
but in their model, competition is over consumers, quality and
prices for heterogenous CPs, none of those works consider a
monopolistic CP as can be encountered for some applications.
The model we consider is inspired from [13], from which
we borrow the basic assumptions, but to which we add the
competition between ISPs. We analyze how this realistic
assumption impacts the results of [13]. We propose a multi-
level game where decisions are taken at different time scales.
The solutions of the games at the largest time scales, played
first, are determined using backward induction, meaning that
players anticipate the impact on, and the resulting solution
of, the games played later on at smaller time scales. We show
that (Bertrand) competition among ISPs leads to zero revenues
for them while the CP gets some, but that introducing side
payments does not solve the problem.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II presents the
basic assumptions of the model we are going to consider,
the different levels of game and the mathematical description
of the investigated comparison between the neutral and the
non-neutral regimes. The next sections present the various
game levels: Section III explains how users choose their ISP,
depending on the price they have to pay; then we describe in
Section IV how at a higher level the CP, anticipating decisions
of end users, chooses the content price. At an even higher level,
still by backward induction, ISPs play a game on the access
charge for end users; this Bertrand competition is described
in Section V. We then describe the game at the highest level
on the economic relationships between the ISPs and the CP,
by determining the side payments of the CP to the ISPs in
Section VI. We determine what happens if those prices are
fixed by ISPs, based on a game; we also look at the case when
they are decided by the CP or a regulator (maximizing social
welfare for instance). Section VII concludes by discussing
the impact and relevance of side payments on the providers’
revenues. It shows that the initial idea to add revenue to the
ISPs is not validated, and therefore that non-neutrality (by
means of side payments) does not help, an argument in favor of
neutrality sympathizers. We also give in this section directions
for future research.
II. MODEL
We consider a single CP, whose parameters will be indexed
by 1, and two ISPs, named (and indexed by) A and B.
The access price per unit of volume charged to users by the
providers is p1 for the CP, and pA and pB for the two ISPs. In
order to study non-neutrality, we also introduce side payments
qA and qB representing the per unit of volume prices that the
CP has to pay to A and B, respectively. Remark here that
we authorize pA, pB , qA and qB to potentially be negative,
meaning that in that case, it is the ISPs who will actually pay
the end users or the CP. The charges imposed by actors to other
players are summarized in Figure 1, the arrows indicating the
cash flows.
End-users
ISP A
pA
ISP BpB
CP 1
qA
qB
p1
Fig. 1. Charging interactions between players
End users on the other hand are assumed infinitesimal, their
total amount of traffic being modeled by a demand function,
assumed to be linear and depending on the total price p¯ that
has to be paid to access the network:
D := [D0 − dp¯]
+ (1)
where D0 is the total demand if the service were free, d is the
sensitivity to the price, and x+ = max(0, x) for all x ∈ R. A
clearer characterization of the total price p¯ will be provided
in the next section, but when going through ISP A or B, the
total price is respectively
p¯A = pA + p1
or p¯B = pB + p1.
The utilities (revenues) of the ISPs are given by the total
amount of volume that goes through them times the total
amount they get per unit:
UA = DA · (pA + qA)
UB = DB · (pB + qB).
The utility of the CP in this model is the sum of revenues
gained by traffic flowing through A and through B (we do
not look at advertisement revenues here, but it could be added
without loss of generality by adding a per unit of volume
revenue). It is thus given by
U1 = DA(p1 − qA) +DB(p1 − qB).
The decision variables are the prices p1, pA, pB , qA, qB , im-
pacting end users (demand), as well as revenues of providers.
Those variables are decided at different time scales or levels,
that can be described as follows.
1) At the largest time scale, the side payments qA and qB
are decided. In the neutral case, they are either fixed
to 0, or determined as a common value. They can be
different in the non-neutral case, and can be determined
either by the ISPs (in a game), the CP, or a regulator. All
those options will be investigated. Those determinations
will be obtained anticipating the solution of the games
below whatever the values of qA and qB (the so-called
backward induction).
2) At a smaller time scale, for fixed values of qA and
qB , the ISPs fix their prices pA and pB during a non-
cooperative game to attract customers and maximize
their revenues. Here again, the decisions are made
anticipating the solutions at lower levels.
3) At an even smaller time scale, the CP sets the price p1.
4) Finally, for those fixed values of p1, pA, pB , qA, qB ,
the users choose their ISP (if not too expensive). This
defines the user equilibrium.
All those interacting levels are now solved by backward
induction, from the smallest time scale to the largest one.
III. USER EQUILIBRIUM
In order to define the user equilibrium, we assume that
users choose the cheapest way to access content, i.e., that they
choose the network with the smallest total price. According to
Wardrop’s principle [6], if p¯A > p¯B , then a user connected to
A would prefer to change ISPs, and reciprocally, if p¯A > p¯B
then a user connected to B would switch to A. We therefore
have
p¯A > p¯B ⇒ DA = 0 (2)
p¯B > p¯A ⇒ DB = 0. (3)
We define
p¯ := min(p¯A, p¯B)
as the total price via an ISP with strictly positive demand, i.e.,
the total price experienced by end-users.
The total demand D can be decomposed into demand DA
at A and DB at B, such that
D = DA +DB .
We have DA = D = D0 − dp¯ (respectively DB = D) if
p¯A > p¯B (respectively p¯B > p¯A), but in the case when p¯A =
p¯B = p¯ (i.e., pA = pB), we assume that there is a coefficient
α ∈ [0, 1] such that DA = αD = α(D0 − dp¯) and DB =
(1 − α)D = (1 − α)(D0 − dp¯). This parameter α represents
the proportion of population going with A because of some
non-monetary preferences like the ISPs relative reputations.
We end up with the following set of equations to define the
user equilibrium:

p¯A = pA + p1
p¯B = pB + p1
p¯ = min(p¯A, p¯B)
D = DA +DB
D = [D0 − dp¯]
+
p¯A > p¯B ⇒ DA = 0
p¯B > p¯A ⇒ DB = 0
p¯B = p¯A ⇒ DA = αD, DB = (1− α)D.
We have the following property:
Proposition 1. For each (pA, pB), there exists a unique user
equilibrium defining DA and DB .
Proof: The proof of this proposition is obvious from the
above equations: if pA > pB , DA = 0, p¯ = pB+p1 and DB =
D0 − dp¯; a symmetric characterisation is obtained pB > pA;
while if pA = pB , p¯ = p¯A = p¯B , D = [D0−dp¯]
+, DA = αD
and DB = (1− α)D.
IV. CONTENT PROVIDER PRICE DETERMINATION
The CP aims at maximizing his revenue U1, for fixed
values of pA, pB , qA, qB , making use of what the resulting
user equilibrium will be. The problem is therefore maxp1 U1
with
U1 =


[D0 − d(pA + p1)]
+(p1 − qA) if pA < pB
[D0 − d(p+ p1)]
+
×(p1 − αqA − (1− α)qB) if pA = pB = p
[D0 − d(pB + p1)]
+
(p1 − qB) if pA > pB ,
(4)
where we have plugged the user equilibrium as defined in the
proof of Proposition 1 into the expression of U1.
Differentiating with respect to p1 in all three cases, we get
for prices such that min(pA, pB) + p1 < D0/d,
∂U1
∂p1
=


D0 − d(pA + p1)− d(p1 − qA) if pA < pB
D0 − d(p+ p1)
−d(p1 − αqA − (1− α)qB) if pA = pB = p
D0 − d(pB + p1)− d(p1 − qB) if pA > pB ,
and the maximum of U1 is therefore obtained at
p∗1 =


1
2
(
D0
d
+ qA − pA
)
if pA < pB
1
2
(
D0
d
+ α(qA − p)
+(1− α)(qB − p)) if pA = pB = p
1
2
(
D0
d
+ qB − pB
)
if pA > pB .
(5)
Note that the following condition must be met for this price
to lead to positive demands:

D0
d
> pA + qA if pA < pB
D0
d
> p+ αqA + (1− α)qB if pA = pB = p
D0
d
> pB + qB if pA > pB .
(6)
That same condition also ensures that the CP makes a strictly
positive profit.
Not surprisingly, the price p∗1 increases when the demand
sensitivity d decreases and when the side payments increase.
V. PRICING GAME BETWEEN ISPS: BERTRAND
COMPETITION
Before the users decide which ISP to join and the CP
chooses p1, the ISPs play a pricing game, making use of what
the CP and users decisions would be. In order to determine the
solution of this game, we need to express the utility functions
of the ISPs. Replacing in UA and UB the expression p1 by
p∗1 in (5), and using the user equilibrium in the proof of
Proposition 1, we get
UA =


1
2
[D0 − (pA + qA)d](pA + qA) if pA < pB
α
2
(
D0 −
(
p+ αqA + (1− α)qB
)
d
)
×(p+ qA) if pA = pB = p
0 if pA > pB .
(7)
We get a similar expression for UB , just inverting the indexes
A and B, and changing α to 1− α.
To determine if there is a Nash equilibrium to this pricing
game, we need to determine the best-response curves of ISPs.
Recall (see [7]) that a Nash equilibrium would be a price
profile (pA, pB) such that no ISP can improve his utility by
unilaterally changing his price. The best-response curves are
defined as (by expliciting the dependence of UA and UB on
pA, pB)
BRA(pB) = arg max
pA≥0
UA(pA, pB) and
BRB(pA) = arg max
pB≥0
UB(pA, pB).
With those notations, a Nash equilibrium is a point (p∗A, p
∗
B)
for which BRA(p
∗
B) = p
∗
A and BRB(p
∗
A) = p
∗
B . Graphically,
if we draw the two best-response curves on the same figure,
the set of Nash equilibria is then the (possibly empty) set of
intersection points of those curves.
We also assume throughout the paper that there is a dis-
cretization value ǫ on the price range values. Indeed, the prices
are usually defined through a unit (cents for instance) such that
when defining a price difference, this cannot be less than ǫ.
We have the following proposition:
Proposition 2. Assuming an ǫ close enough to zero, there is
a unique equilibrium (p∗A, p
∗
B) to the price war:
1) If qA < qB , the equilibrium is (−qA,−qA − ǫ),
2) If qA > qB , the equilibrium is (−qB − ǫ,−qB),
3) If qA = qB = q, the equilibrium is (−q,−q).
We typically end up with a Bertrand competition [7], in
which ISPs decrease their price to attract all demand from the
competitor, up to the moment where revenue becomes zero
for one of them. In this case, when the side payments qA
and qB are positive, then because of the competition it is the
ISPs which give money to the end users, the money they are
getting coming from the CP. Best-response curves (and the
Nash equilibrium) are illustrated by Figure 2 when qA < qB
(the case qB < qA is symmetric), and in Figure 3 when qA =
qB .
Proof: We start by determining the best-response func-
tions of ISPs. We do it for A, as the case of B is symmetric.
We can note that UA in (7), as a function of pA with pB
−qA D0
2d
− qA
−qB
D0
2d
− qB
pA
p
B
p∗A
p∗B
Fig. 2. best-response curves in the price war when qA < qB . Parameter
values: qA = 20, qB = 30, D0 = 100, d = 2, α = 0.5.
−qA D0
2d
− qA
−qB
D0
2d
− qB
pA
p
B
p∗A
p∗B
Fig. 3. Best-response curves in the price war when qA = qB . Parameter
values: qA = qB = 50, D0 = 100, d = 2, α = 0.4.
fixed, is continuous on (−∞, pB), has a given value on pB ,
and is 0 on (pB ,+∞). The function of pA that defines UA for
pA < pB ,
1
2
[D0−(pA+qA)d]
+(pA+qA), is first increasing up
to D0
2d
− qA, then decreasing up to
D0
d
− qA, and then constant
equal to 0. Remark therefore that for A to obtain a strictly
positive demand (and thus, utility), the condition in (6) must
be satisfied, i.e., the CP also makes some benefit.
As a consequence:
• if D0
2d
− qA < pB , the maximum of UA for pA < pB is
obtained at that point, and equals 1
8
D2
0
d
.
• if −qA ≤ pB ≤
D0
2d
− qA, then the maximum of UA for
pA < pB is obtained at pB − ǫ and is
1
2
(
D0 − ((pB −
ǫ) + qA)d
)
((pB − ǫ) + qA).
• if pB < −qA then pA < pB would imply that the revenue
of A cannot be positive. It is therefore better for A to get
zero revenue, for example with the price pA = −qA, but
actually any price pA > pB is a best-reply of A in that
case.
To determine the best-reply on (−∞,+∞), we now only
have to compare the value at those points with UA(pB , pB),
which gives:
• when pB > D0/(2d)− qA, UA(
D0
2d
− qA, pB) =
1
8
D2
0
d
to
be compared with UA(pB , pB) =
α
2
[
D0−
(
pB +αqA+
(1−α)qB
)
d
]+
(pB+qA). We prove here that it is always
better for A to set pA =
D0
2d
− qA in that case.
– When pB > D0/d − (αqA + (1 − α)qB) then
UA(pB , pB) = 0 and player A is better off setting
pA = D0/(2d)− qA.
– Otherwise, the difference UA(D0/(2d)− qA, pB)−
UA(pB , pB) can be seen as a degree-2 polynomial
in D0, with discriminant of the same sign as
−α(1− α)(pB + qA)(pB + qB).
We have pB > D0/(2d)−qA therefore pB+qA > 0.
On the other hand, Provider B should set pB ≥ −qB
in order to make profit, so that the discriminant is
non-positive, and thus the difference UA(D0/(2d)−
qA, pB)− UA(pB , pB) is always non-negative.
• When −qA ≤ pB ≤ D0/(2d) − qA, UA(pB − ǫ, pB) =
1
2
[D0 − (pB − ǫ + qA)d](pB − ǫ + qA), still to be
compared with UA(pB , pB) =
α
2
[
D0 −
(
pB + αqA +
(1 − α)qB
)
d
]+
(pB + qA). In that case, Provider A is
better off setting pA = pB when pB is above a threshold,
and setting pA = pB − ǫ otherwise. When ǫ → 0 that
threshold equals D0
d
− qA − α(qA − qB).
• the case pB < −qA does not offer any possibility for
A to have a positive revenue, so does not need to be
considered here.
A symmetric behaviour is deduced for B.
On Figure 3, it can be noted (looking at the blue curve)
that when pB is right above −qA, the best response for B is
pB − ǫ, but becomes pB when when pB increases; this comes
from the comparison between UA(pB , pB) and UA(pB−ǫ, pB)
described above.
But remark that we cannot have simultaneously the maxi-
mum obtained at the value of the opponent, i.e., BRA(pB) =
BRB(pA) = pA = pB = p, with strictly positive utilities.
Indeed, it is not possible that each utility value at the price of
the opponent is larger than the value just below, i.e., that{
limpA→p UA(pA, p) ≤ UA(p, p)
limpB→p UB(p, pB) ≤ UB(p, p).
For strictly positive utilities, this would be equivalent to{
D0 − (p+ qA)d ≤ α(D0 − (p+ αqA + (1− α)qB)d)
D0 − (p+ qB)d ≤ (1− α)(D0 − (p+ αqA + (1− α)qB)d),
i.e., {
D0
d
− p ≤ qA + α(qA − qB)
D0
d
− p ≤ qB + (1− α)(qB − qA).
Summing the two equations, this leads to
D0
d
− p ≤ αqA + (1− α)qB ,
which contradicts the fact that demand at p is positive (and
therefore the utilities UA(p, p) and UB(p, p)), using p
∗
1 in (5).
As a consequence, and as shown in Figures 2 and 3, a
player’s best interest is always to play less than its opponent,
up to the moment when the revenue of one of them becomes
zero (which means by (7) that pA = −qA or pB = −qB). In
that case, if qA = qB , we get the third item in the proposition,
no ISP can reduce his price anymore, while if qA < qB , B
can reduce his price to −qA − ǫ, while A cannot go below
−qA without having a negative revenue. In that situation, no
ISP can unilaterally increase his revenue. The symmetric case
qA > qB is obtained similarly. This concludes the proof of the
proposition.
VI. SIDE PAYMENTS DETERMINATION
We consider at the higher level three possibilities for the
choice of side payments qA and qB . We first look at the
case when they are determined by the CP (even if unlikely in
practice), then the case when they result from a game played
between ISPs, and finally the case when they are determined
by a regulator (to maximize social welfare).
A. Determined by the CP
Plugging into the expression of the utility U1 of the CP (4)
the optimal value p∗1 in (5) and the prices of the war determined
in Proposition 2, we get
U1(qA, qB) =


1
4d
(D0 − d(qB − qA − ǫ))
2 if qA < qB
1
4
D2
0
d
if qA = qB
1
4d
(D0 − d(qA − qB − ǫ))
2 if qA > qB .
(8)
If the parameter ǫ is a very small amount (less than |qA−qB |,
if it is positive), the optimum is obtained when qA = qB = q,
irrespective of its value because an increase of side payments
would result in an equal increase of the value p∗1, so that the
revenue U1 does not change. Remark that the ISPs then make
no profit at all, all benefits going to the CP with a total value
D2
0
4d
.
B. Determined by the ISPs, through a game
If we instead assume that the side payments are non-
cooperatively determined by the ISPs, recall first that the
utility functions of A and B are (using the equilibrium of
Proposition 2, highlighting the dependence on qA and qB):
UA(qA, qB)=


1
2
[D0 − (qA − qB − ǫ)d]
×(qA − qB − ǫ) if qA > qB
0 if qA = qB = q
0 if qA < qB ,
(9)
UB(qA, qB) =


1
2
[D0 − (qB − qA − ǫ)d]
×(qB − qA − ǫ) if qB > qA
0 if qA = qB = q
0 if qB < qA.
(10)
In that case, the ISPs best interest is always to play a larger
side payment than his opponent. As a consequence, there is
no Nash equilibrium, the side payments will naturally tend to
+∞.
Remark here too that sending the side payments to infinity
does not mean that the perceived price goes itself to infinity
(nor that demand is 0), those payments are indeed given back
to the end users by the ISPs, and the content providers price
is also increased by this amount (nullifying the effect).
C. Determined by a regulator
A regulator can either decide to maximize the revenue of the
supply chain (sum of utilities of the ISPs plus the CP), the user
welfare (end-users surplus), or the social welfare (including
user welfare and all providers utilities).
In our model, all subscribers pay the same unit price
p¯ = p1 + min(pA, pB). But some of them would have
accepted (or were willing) to pay more than p¯ to benefit from
the service: for example among the total demand D(p¯), the
amount of traffic that was (unitarily) worth at least p˜ is D(p˜).
The difference between the actual value of the traffic (the
price the user is willing to pay) and the price actually paid
is considered to be a profit made by the user. User Welfare
(UW) is defined as the total profit of the users corresponding
to the service. It can be computed using the demand function
as
UW =
∫ +∞
p=p¯
D(p)dp, (11)
and is illustrated in Figure 4. For our linear demand function,
we have
UW =
d
2
(
D0
d
− p¯
)2
when p¯ ∈ [0, D0/d]. UW naturally increases when the
perceived price decreases, because new subscribers get some
surplus and the already present subscribers experience a higher
surplus.
Similarly, the total price paid by users equals p¯ D(p¯). This
amount is shared among the three providers, and is therefore
the total value of the supply chain. Its expression is simply
U1 + UA + UB = p¯ [D0 − dp¯]
+
as illustrated in Figure 4.
Finally, the Social Welfare is defined as the overall value of
the service for the society. It therefore includes the surpluses
D(p)
U1 + UA + UB
UW
p¯ D0/d p
0
D(p¯)
D0
User Welfare UW
Total revenue
Fig. 4. The different surpluses
of all actors, and equals
SW = U1 + UA + UB + UW.
For the linear demand function D, we have
SW =
1
2d
(
D20 − d
2p¯2
)
.
In summary, Social Welfare corresponds to the total value
that the service has for subscribers, without considering any
monetary exchanges because they stay within the society. It is
therefore natural that Social Welfare increases when demand
increases, i.e. when the perceived price decreases.
As Figure 4 illustrates, all the measures defined in this
section (total provider surplus, user welfare, social welfare)
depend only on the perceived price p¯ that results from the
pricing decisions of the CP and the ISPs. The following
proposition gives the value of that perceived price when the
side payments vary.
Proposition 3. When ǫ tends to zero, at the overall pricing
equilibrium (including CP and ISPs decisions) the perceived
price p¯ = p∗1 +min(pA, pB) tends to
p¯ =
1
2
(
D0
d
+ |qA − qB |
)
. (12)
Proof: We directly apply Proposition 2:
• if qA < qB then the equilibrium of the pricing game is
(pA, pB) = (−qA,−qA − ǫ). Since pB < pA, the CP
decision gives p∗1 =
1
2
(D0/d + qB + qA + ǫ) from (5),
which yields p¯ = 1
2
(
D0
d
+ |qA − qB |+ ǫ
)
if ǫ < |qA −
qB |. When ǫ→ 0 we obtain (12).
• The case qA > qB can be treated similarly.
• If qA = qB = q, then pA = pB = −q from Proposition 2,
and (5) implies that p∗1 =
1
2
(D0/d+ 2q). Then p¯ =
D0
2d
,
which is still consistent with (12).
1) Side-payments to maximize the supply chain value:
Summing the utilities (8), (9), and (10) of the supply chain,
we get
U1+UA+UB =
{
D2
0
4d
− d
4
(|qA − qB | − ǫ))
2 if qA 6= qB
D2
0
4d
if qA = qB ,
which is maximized when qA = qB = q and does not depend
on the value of q. Note that the value 1
4
D2
0
d
is actually the
absolute maximum that could be reached by all providers if
they decided to collaborate: this can be easily seen on Figure 4,
since 1
4
D2
0
d
is the surface of the largest rectangle below the
demand function.
2) Side payments to maximize User Welfare or Social
Welfare: If the objective of a regulator is to maximize user or
social welfare, as we saw in the beginning of this section the
side payments should be chosen so as to minimize the resulting
perceived price p¯. From Proposition 3, that perceived price is
minimized when qA = qB = q, for any value of q.
3) On the efficiency of side payments: The previous sub-
sections have highlighted the fact that equal side payments
are likely to be selected. On the other hand, recall that when
qA = qB then no ISP makes any profit, and the CP takes
all the supply chain surplus, that equals
D2
0
4d
. This suggests
that the ISPs’ arguments regarding the CPs extracting most of
the benefit is legitimate. However, our model also suggests
that side payments would not benefit to ISPs, since equal
side payments have no effect while asymmetric side payments
imply that one ISP is thrown out of the market.
VII. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have provided in this paper a model describing the
interactions between two ISPs in competition, a CP and end
users connecting to the network through the least expensive
ISP. With respect to the literature, we believe that considering
competitive ISPs and a single CP is a more realistic representa-
tion of the current network where we have a quasi-monopole
for some applications (for instance YouTube) while several
ISPs are in competition (an argument of ISPs). The goal is
to study the impact of side payments on providers’ revenues
and conclude if this can help ISPs to increase their revenue,
as they claim in the current network neutrality debate.
The above sections have presented a four-level game where
(from the largest to the shortest time scale) the side payments
are first determined, then a pricing game is played between
ISPs, followed by the content provider price, and finally,
knowing all those prices, end users choose their ISP, or none
if too expensive. All those levels are played by backward
induction, meaning that players anticipate the solutions of the
later games when choosing their strategies.
The following remarks can be made from our analysis:
• The idea of introducing side payments in the net neutral-
ity debate was to ensure that ISPs would recover their cost
and reinvest in the architecture but, as we have shown,
this does not help the ISPs to get a higher revenue. If
ISPs choose the side payments, there is no equilibrium
and even in other cases, the equilibrium is independent
of those side payments;
• the reason for that is the Bertrand competition between
ISPs which drives their revenue to zero; side payments
are “counter-balanced” by competition in the sense that
side payments are poured back to end users in order to
attract them.
As a conclusion, side payments are actually not of interest for
ISPs, they do not help in a competitive situation.
As future research, we would like to go into several direc-
tions: first to include several CPs with different contents, but
such that some end users are targeting only a subset of them,
for all possible subsets. ISPs may also charge each other to
let the CPs not connected to them reach their own customers.
Other extensions to our model include dealing with a non-
linear demand, including a congestion cost as in [16] (but
where it is not related to network neutrality), and/or including
architecture investment and content innovation characteristics,
for the ISPs and the CP respectively.
ACKNOWLEGMENTS
This work has been supported by INRIA’s ARC project
MENEUR on network neutrality and French ANR VERSO
project CAPTURES on competition beween providers.
REFERENCES
[1] A. Odlyzko, “Network neutrality, search neutrality, and the never-ending
conflict between efficiency and fairness in markets,” Review of Network
Economics, vol. 8, no. 1, pp. 40–60, 2009.
[2] A. Ghosh and A. Sayedi, “Expressive auctions for externalities in online
advertising,” in Proc. of 19th World Wide Web conference (WWW),
Raleigh, NC, USA, April 2010.
[3] D. Liu, J. Chen, and A. Whinston, “Competing keyword auctions,” in
Proc. of 4th Workshop on Ad Auctions, Chicago, IL, USA, Jul 2008.
[4] ARCEP, “Neutralite´ de l’internet et des re´seaux: propositions
et orientations,” 2010, http://www.arcep.fr/uploads/tx gspublication/
net-neutralite-orientations-sept2010.pdf.
[5] S. Wong, R.-M. J., and E. Altman, “Public consultations on Net
Neutrality 2010: USA, EU and France,” SSRN, Tech. Rep., 2010,
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1684086.
[6] D. Fudenberg and J. Tirole, Game Theory. MIT Press, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, 1991.
[7] M. Osborne and A. Rubinstein, A Course in Game theory. MIT Press,
1994.
[8] R. Ma, D.-M. Chiu, J. Lui, V. Misra, and D. Rubenstein, “Intercon-
necting eyeballs to content: A Shapley value perspective on isp peering
and settlement,” in Proc. of International Workshop on Economics of
Networked Systems (NetEcon), 2008, pp. 61–66.
[9] ——, “On cooperative settlement between content, transit and eyeball
internet service providers,” in Proc. of ACM International Conference on
Emerging Networking EXperiments and Technologies (CoNEXT), 2008.
[10] J. Musacchio, J. Walrand, and G. Schwartz, “Network neutrality and
provider investment incentives,” in Proc. of 41st Asilomar Conference
on Signals, Systems and Computers (ACSSC), Nov 2007, pp. 1437 –
1444.
[11] J. Musacchio, G. Schwartz, and J. Walrand, “A two-sided market
analysis of provider investment incentives with an application to the
net-neutrality issue,” Review of Network Economics, vol. 8, no. 1, 2009.
[12] C. Saavedra, “Bargaining power and the net neutrality debate,” 2009,
sites.google.com/site/claudiasaavedra/attachments/bargaining power.
pdf.
[13] E. Altman, P. Bernhard, S. Caron, G. Kesidis, J. Rojas-Mora, and
S. Wong, “A study of non-neutral networks with usage-based prices,” in
Proc. of 3rd ETM Workshop, Amsterdam, The Netherlands, Sept 2010.
[14] E. Altman, A. Legout, and Y. Xu, “Network non-neutrality debate: An
economic analysis,” in Proc. of Networking. Barcelona, Spain: LNCS
6641, Springer Verlag, May 2011, pp. 68–81.
[15] P. Njoroge, A. Ozdaglar, N. Stier-Moses, and G. Weintraub, “Investment
in two sided markets and the net neutrality debate,” Columbia University,
Decision, Risk and Operations Working Papers Series, Tech. Rep. DRO-
2010-05, 2010.
[16] D. Acemoglu and A. Ozdaglar, “Competition and efficiency in congested
markets,” Mathematics of Operations Research, vol. 32, no. 1, pp. 1–31,
Feb 2007.
